The Eternal Emergency?: Denmark’s Legal Response to COVID-19 in Review by Lauta, Kristian Cedervall
The Eternal Emergency? Denmark’s
Legal Response to COVID-19 in Review
Kristian Cedervall Lauta 2021-03-22T09:00:54
On 11th March 2020 the Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen found herself in
a historic moment. The infection numbers in Denmark had dramatically increased
within the last 24 hours – from just 157 infected in total on the 10th of March to 514
on March 11th – and a, now well-documented, disagreement between the health
authorities and the government on the overall strategy had forced the hand of the
Prime Minister to take decisive action.
Dressed all in black, the prime minister ceremonially opened the press conference
with the, now famous, words: “What I will tell you tonight, will have major implications
for all Danes”. Indeed, almost one year from the Prime minister’s public prophecy,
we can conclude – it did.
The following day the Parliament, uniformly, adopted a new Epidemic Act under an
emergency procedure, allowing to disregard the usual 30-day law making procedure.
To mark the historic significance the entire Parliament ceremonially rose up to make
the final vote, and to display their support for the paradigm change in general, and
the government in particular.
The last year has metaphorically been quite a compression test of the Danish
constitutional system. A lot has happened since this historical display of unity and
vigor.
In a recently published official evaluation report of the management of COVID-19
from January through May 2020, an expert group have probed the political, legal and
scientific decisions of Denmark made in those days of March. The report, drafted
by experts from political science, law and epidemiology, first and foremost has
praise for the Danish response: for the balance hit between rule of law and need for
speed and agility; for the overall balance between political will and scientific basis
and the balance between efficiency for public health and individual human rights.
Overall, the report concludes that there is a need for ultimate political leadership and
accountability in a crisis with a scale of COVID-19.
However, there is also significant things to consider for future regulatory design of
emergency laws. Thus, while the compression test showed us a robust constitutional
state, it also gave way for some cracks.
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The Cracks: Centralization, Division of Powers and
Health Expertise
In March 2020 the government was granted a, by any standard, very broad legal
basis to manage the emergency with a sunset clause running for an entire year.
In other words, Parliament decided within just 24 hours to hand the government a
power tool of a legal apparatus, with limited judicial and parliamentary oversight,
and running for a full year. This was properly a mistake in hindsight, in particular
the sunset clause running for a full year, was probably a step too far. While the
government has evened this out by including parliament in a number of decisions,
there has also been situations underlining the need for such guarantees in the legal
“decision design” of emergency legislation in the future.
According to the expert committee’s report, the government used this broad legal
mandate to centralize the response, centering all significant decisions in a small
circle organized around the Prime Minister herself.
For the last 8 months, I have had the honor of chairing a task force, initiated by
the labor union DJØF, on Denmark’s response from a rule of law perspective. Our
comparative investigations of Europe in the Spring, suggest that, Denmark came out
in top with regard to relative human rights protection in the early spring. However,
while on the one hand centralized decision making meant that Denmark stroke a
good balance overall, a more proportionate, flexible response would have allowed
for more sectorial differentiation and regionalization of the response. To be fair,
these recommendations were better reflected in the fall management, where the
Government used a much more fine-tuned approach to reduce public activities, and
managed, up until Christmas, to keep the infection at bay, while proportionately
considering human rights interest.
Furthermore, the centralization around government made the reopening process,
which requires many more, and more nuanced, decisions slower in comparison to
our European neighbors. Thus, while Denmark came out in top in the early spring of
2020 in terms of protecting individual rights, by the Summer Denmark were the lower
third of European countries in terms of restrictions on assemblies. Similar, it seems
Denmark is presently taking a very precautionary approach to lifting restrictions
on shops, schools and health facilities which, in essence, have been closed since
before Christmas.
The controversy that led to the first official parliamentary investigation of the
government’s response in first place, was the government’s use of expert (health)
authorities. When the Prime Minister spoke on 11 March 2020, the director of
the Danish Health Authority was standing two podiums away. While the prime
minister in her speech referred to the decision as made per recommendation of
the “authorities”, leaks, and since the official investigation, points out that this is a
stretch, to put it mildly. In fact, the decision to transfer power to government, was
to a wide extend driven by a significant disagreement on the appropriate strategy
between government and the Danish Health Authority. While the evaluation report
criticizes the prime minister for this inaccuracy, the fact that the decision on the
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actual strategy since has served Denmark well has deescalated the criticism of
government.
A number of decisions made by the Government with reference to the Epidemic Act
has also tested the separation of powers. Lack of clarity as to whether the courts
reduced activity in March due to a direct order by government or decided to do so
themselves, is one such example. The courts have since strengthened their internal
procedures, and thereby reinforced an effective separation of power. Similarly,
the Government in January 2021 recommended Parliament to reduce activities,
including the increasing scrutiny of government corona decisions, the latter part was
rejected by Parliament – showing the separation of power at work.
Over the fall and winter 2020 the Parliament has grown increasingly impatient with,
and critical against, the government’s response, and the parliamentary landscape
today is far from the unity initially displayed in the beginning of the crisis. As we
speak the Danish political opposition is putting a heavy pressure on Government to
lift restrictions on commercial activities and schools, and civil unrest is increasingly
common – as the patience of the population grows thinner. The youngest pupils
were allowed back in early February 2021, while all others are still on hold. One
public scandal however stands out.
A Gap? #Minkgate
8 months down the road from the initial display of power, unity and trust – the
Prime Minister again stepped up to the microphone in the Ministry of State’s
representation room, the mirror room, with an equally significant, however more
contested, message to the Danes. Since late summer 2020, authorities had received
increasingly worrying notifications and assessments of a new mutation of COVID-19,
cluster 5, spreading through mink farms, in particular from Northern Jutland. Strict
measures imposed regionally in the past weeks and months had been to no avail:
the mutation seemed to spread rapidly among the mink and even across farms,
and a public official had at a past press conference talked of the potential of a new
Wuhan, this time in Northern Jutland, making pundits talk about Wuhanstholm
(Hanstholm is a city in Northern Jutland). On November 4th of 2020, 207 mink farms
across the country had registered cases of COVID-19. Not a good situation indeed.
Faced with this uncertainty, the prime minister relied on what had served her well
in the past 8 months: her intuition and an extreme version of the precautionary
principle. At the press conference she stated [in my translation], “it is necessary to
cull all farmed mink, immediately”. It has since been reported that the Prime minister
was informed hours before the press conference, that the Government had no legal
basis to issues such an order. In spite of this knowledge, the government maintained
the order. While informing the chair of the Parliament of the missing legal basis, and
in coming days taking steps to secure such a legal basis, the government made
no separate effort to stop the ongoing operation to cull farmed mink and await the
legal basis. Contrary, reports in the media suggest that the police was instructed to
force farmers to keep up the culling without delay; and veterinary authorities in clear
languages instructed farmers to continue the culling – as a precaution. Accordingly,
farmers were placed in a limbo, with authorities pushing to expedite the culling of
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mink, while the legal basis – and thereby also the compensation scheme – was
not yet in place. Mink mass graves in areas environmentally unfit and scientists
questioning evidence creating the basis for the decision, create another layer of
scandal to what in Denmark is referred to as “minkgate”.
The whole decision process will be scrutinized by an expert group appointed by
Parliament, and accordingly we will soon have a fuller picture of the sequence of
events. However, minkgate already, disregarding the findings of the expert group,
frame a number of issues under the Danish Constitution untested by this crisis up
until this point: necessity and legality, the scope of the protection of private property
under article 73 (expropriation) and the whether the Danish Constitution contains a
principle of legality. While the government never officially called upon the principle of
constitutional necessity, they flirtatiously referred to the need to favor public health
over legal procedure. The scandal caused the departure of the responsible minister,
Mogens Jensen, but more political scandals might be attempted buried with the
culled mink.
2021: Recommendations for Governance,
Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law
As the sunset clause on the Epidemic Act expired on 1 March 2021, the Parliament
has adopted a new permanent Epidemic Act. The first proposal put forward in the
fall, resembling the emergency act presently in force, was pugnaciously rejected
both by Parliament, civil society and interest groups. Accordingly, the Government
stroke a new political deal including most parties in Parliament in December setting
out the overall lines of a new Act. The new Act includes parliamentary oversight
and veto for a number of the most intervening steps the government could take.
Furthermore, the act ensures automatic judicial review of measures resembling
retention. The Act was adopted in an unusually hectic manner in Parliament, with
many proposed amendments tabled at the final vote – causing the voting system of
Parliament to collapse due to technical errors.
While the law seems well-thought through in terms of these control mechanisms,
a number of initiatives remain unchecked. Furthermore, the balance between
professional health experts and politicians are still undefined in some places. Finally,
the law does not address compensation for measures applied under the law, unless
in cases of expropriation. This question is awaiting the recommendations of a
committee working the next year. Thus, the Government is hoping to steer clear of
the Corona restrictions before creating a permanent compensation scheme. While
this on the hand might be understandable in light of the scale of the restrictions
needed in the last year to tame COVID-19, the lack of foreseeability and certainty
is on the other hand starting to severely affect small and medium sized business
owners in Denmark.
In light of recent suggestions, that COVID-19 will not go away, the adoption of
a new permanent Epidemic Act poses the question on how to officially stop the
public emergency? While COVID-19 had a clear beginning, at least in Denmark,
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it does not, from an epidemiological perspective, necessarily have a clear end.
This creates the need to introduce some kind of conclusion mechanism: a forced
decision at some point, that while COVID-19 might still be out there, the public
health emergency, and the legal apparatus designed to deal with this, is over. The
alternative is the risk of an eternal emergency. Such mechanism is not part of the
present law but should be considered and publicly discussed in the month to come.
In conclusion, Denmark has hit a good balance in terms of human rights and rule
of law, and the constitution has, even under severe pressure, passed the test.
However, as always with crisis, COVID-19 is a great learning opportunity for future
emergency response in particular, and for the rule of law in general. The experience
we have gained the last year, calls to reform the crisis management setup in
Denmark, to reinforce the separation of powers, and to strengthen the judicial
mindset with government and central administration.
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